Carlo Levi was a painter, writer, and antifascist Italian from a Jewish family, and his political activism forced him into exile for most of the Second World War. While in exile, he wrote _Christ Stopped at Eboli_, a memoir, and _Fear of Freedom_, a philosophical meditation on humanity's flight from moral and spiritual autonomy and our resulting loss of self and creativity. Brooding on what surely appeared to be the decline, if not the fall of Europe, Levi locates the human (...) abdication of responsibility in organized religion and its ability to turn the sacred into the sacrificial. In doing so, he references the entire intellectual and cultural estate of Western civilization, from the Bible and Greek mythology to Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung. This edition features newly published pieces of Levi's artwork and the first English translation of his essay "Fear of Painting," which was appended to a later publication of the work. It also includes an introduction that discusses Levi's life and enduring legacy. Written as war clouds were gathering over Europe, _Fear of Freedom_ not only addresses a specific moment in history and a universal, timeless condition, but it is also a powerful indictment of our contemporary moral and political failures. (shrink)

Book Review of "The Purposes of God: Providence as Process-Historical Liberation" by G. Michael Zbaraschuk.

Henry Leonard and Karel Lambert first introduced so-called presupposition-free (or just simply: free) logics in the 1950’s in order to provide a logical framework allowing for non-denoting singular terms (be they descriptions or constants) such as “the largest prime” or “Pegasus” (see Leonard [1956] and Lambert [1960]). Of course, ever since Russell’s paradigmatic treatment of definite descriptions (Russell [1905]), philosophers have had a way to deal with such terms. A sentence such as “the..

In his recent paper, “What a Real Argument is”, Ben Hamby attempts to provide an adequate theoretical account of “real” arguments. In this paper I present and evaluate both Hamby’s motivation for distinguishing “real” from non-“real” arguments and his articulation of the distinction. I argue that neither is adequate to ground a theoretically significant class of “real” arguments, for the articulation fails to pick out a stable proper subclass of all arguments that is simultaneously both theoretically relevant and a proper (...) subclass of all arguments. (shrink)

In this paper we introduce the notion of a set algebra S satisfying a system E of equations. After defining a notion of freeness for such algebras, we show that, for any system E of equations, set algebras that are free in the class of structures satisfying E exist and are unique up to a bisimulation. Along the way, analogues of classical set-theoretic and algebraic properties are investigated.

Aldo Antonelli offers a novel view on abstraction principles in order to solve a traditional tension between different requirements: that the claims of science be taken at face value, even when involving putative reference to mathematical entities; and that referents of mathematical terms are identified and their possible relations to other objects specified. In his view, abstraction principles provide representatives for equivalence classes of second-order entities that are available provided the first- and second-order domains are in the equilibrium dictated by (...) the abstraction principles, and whose choice is otherwise unconstrained.entities are the referents of abstraction terms: such referents are to an extent indeterminate, but we can still quantify over them, predicate identity or non-identity, etc. Our knowledge of them is limited, but still substantial: we know whatever has to be true no matter how the representatives are chosen, i.e., what is true in all models of the corresponding abstraction principles. This view is backed up by an “austere” conception of universals, according to which these are first-order objects, i.e., ways of collecting first-order objects. Antonelli thus claims that second-order logic does not import any novel ontological commitment beyond ontology of first-order, naturalistically acceptable, objects. Moreover, in the case of arithmetic, even if Hume’s Principle is construed as described above, Frege’s Theorem goes through unaffected, since there is nothing in its proof that depends on an account of the “true nature” of numbers. A viable construal of logicism is then given by the combination of semantic nominalism and a naturalistic conception of abstraction. [Editors note]. (shrink)

New Institutional Theory is used to explain the context for argumentation in modern practice. The illustration of Direct to Consumer Drug advertising is deployed to show how communicative argument between a doctor and patient is influenced by force exogenous to the practice of medicine. The essay shows how strategic maneuvering shifts the burden of proof within institutional relations.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:C. Suetonius Tranquillus: De Grammaticis et RhetoribusJames E. G. ZetzelR. A. Kaster, ed. C. Suetonius Tranquillus: De Grammaticis et Rhetoribus. Edited with a translation, introduction, and commentary. Oxford: Clarendon Press. lx 1 370 pp. Cloth, $72.00.From a very early stage, the Romans were interested in their own literary history. In the second century B.C.E., Accius composed his didascalica; in the first century, Varro, Cornelius Nepos, and Julius Hyginus (...) all wrote biographies of literary figures; and early in the second century c.e. Suetonius wrote a set of books De uiris illustribus, giving accounts of the lives of Roman poets, historians, orators, philosophers—and teachers of grammar and rhetoric. Our knowledge of the first four categories of writers is exiguous: aside from Cicero’s Brutus, which is of more importance for chronology than for biography proper, we have the versions of some of Suetonius’ lives of the poets that are attached to scholia and the one-sentence notices excerpted from Suetonius by Jerome in his adaptation of Eusebius’ Chronicle; we also have occasional anecdotes in the elder Seneca, Aulus Gellius, and a few other sources. The vagaries of textual transmission, however, have left us much better off with the last of Suetonius’ rubrics: a single manuscript survived to the middle ages containing (along with Tacitus’ minor works) the portion of De uiris illustribus known as De grammaticis et rhetoribus (DGR). The text is badly preserved, and it is also incomplete: of the sixteen professors of rhetoric once included, lives of only five remain. Even so, it is a text of considerable importance for students of Roman education and, indeed, of Roman intellectual life: not only does it describe the origins of grammatical and rhetorical education at Rome, it discusses the origins, character, and students of the men who taught the elite of Rome; it preserves anecdotes involving the leading political and literary figures of the first centuries B.C.E. and c.e.; and along the way it offers quotations, otherwise unknown, from such figures as Valerius Cato, Helvius Cinna, Furius Bibaculus, Cicero, Asinius Pollio, and Asinius Gallus.Until now, DGR has been an extraordinarily difficult text to understand or [End Page 475] to use. Suetonius’ chronology is vague, his biographical reconstructions obscure, and his narratives maddeningly brief and anecdotal—not to mention the fact that the text itself is so corrupt that the words themselves are not always easy to ascertain. No longer: with Robert Kaster’s magnificent edition, DGR is a text that cannot only be read, but understood, used, and even (at times) admired. In some respects, K. is the perfect match for Suetonius: like Suetonius, K.’s principal interest is not in the internal history of ancient education, but in its external history, above all in the social context and significance of teaching at Rome. It should also be said, however, that in other ways K. is far better than Suetonius: where the ancient text is brief, elliptical, and anecdotal, K. is thorough, patient, and extraordinarily learned. K.’s edition includes a long introduction, a new critical text and facing translation, and an exhaustive commentary, followed by four appendices (of which the longest and most important concerns Suetonius’ use of the elder Seneca). A brief review can scarcely do justice to K.’s achievement; a few comments will have to suffice.Introduction: Although DGR is perhaps the portion of De uiris illustribus that modern scholars would most happily have done without, K. turns the very obscurity of the subject matter to good advantage. In writing of poets, historians, and the rest, Suetonius could make full use of earlier biographers such as Nepos and Hyginus; with the teachers, he had no such sources. As a result, DGR provides an excellent laboratory in which to observe Suetonius’ working methods: K. analyzes brilliantly the way in which he collected his information, how it is related to his research for the lives of literary figures, and the strengths and weaknesses of Suetonius’ approach. In both the introduction and the commentary (to singularly good effect in his analysis of DGR1–4 on the origins of grammatical teaching at Rome), K. pays close attention... (shrink)

During the excavations of 1924–5 at Karanis a papyrus of the second or early third century A.D. was discovered, and subsequently published by J. G. Winter , which under its single column has a subscribed title which should almost certainly be restored as ‘Alcidamas, On Homer’. The first fourteen lines of the papyrus give most of the story of Homer's death and the riddle that caused it, which is common to all the extant Lives of Homer; the remainder is a (...) general eulogy of Homer and a profession of transmitting his works to posterity. The interest of the discovery lies in the knowledge that it gives of a hitherto unrecorded work by Alcidamas, the rhetorician and contemporary of Isocrates, and the new fuel that it provides for an old controversy about the origins of the work known as the Certamen. The first part of this article aims at both re-examining the value of the papyrus and reopening some of the old questions on the Certamen. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to offer what I consider to be necessary substantiati for the view that the description of the walk which acts as a frame for the singing contest in Id. 7 is based on a precise knowledge of the geography of t island of Cos and that the poem thus displays a topographical realism unique Greek pastoral.

Is it possible for an argument to have either zero premises or an infinite number of premises? I shall argue that regardless of how you conceive of arguments you should accept that an argument could have an infinite number of premises. The zero case is more complicated since the matter seems to depend not only on the metaphysics of arguments, but also the nature and function of arguing. I shall argue that at least a plausible case can be made for (...) the possibility of zero premise arguments. (shrink)

In his recent pamphlet on Herodotus the Historian, Friederich Focke has discussed the lion-portent which accompanied the birth of Pericles: έκ δ Ίππоκπτεоς Μεγακλνσ τε Ξλλоσ κα ᾈγαπоτνς, ;λ· λπ τα ᾽Αγαριστŋς хоυσα τò о;νоѵоνα. σооνικńσασ τε ξανθππψ τ᾽ Απιφρоνоς κα λκυоς éоûα εδε ψℓν ν τ πν. δκεε δ λοντα τεκεṿ κα υετ᾽ ợλγας υρας τκτει Пερικλα ξανθππψ. As this is the only occasion on which Herodotus mentions Pericles by name, those critics who are concerned to show that Herodotus (...) was ‘Pericles' man’ have made much of the passage, and have deduced therefrom that Herodotus here means to express all his pent-up admiration for Pericles, which otherwise the scope of his work did not give him an opportunity of displaying. This admiration is at least conveyed in cryptic form, and Focke, following up a hint of Nissen that Pericles is here called a lion ambiguously, combats the view that Herodotus is expressing great reverence for him; and after examining fifth-century parallels, comes to the conclusion that Herodotus was repeating a tradition that had been set afoot as a purposely ambiguous and derogatory reference to Pericles as a ‘tyrannical man of might.’ After an examination of Focke's evidence, however, I remain unconvinced. It seems possible to account for most of thes quotations which Focke makes by bringing them into line with the ordinary Greek use of leonine symbolism, which, as I shall try to show, was complimentary, not derogatory. (shrink)